This paper studies a model of how political parties use resources for campaigning to inform voters. We show existence of equilibrium under mild assumptions for an arbitrary number of parties. The main result is that if the parties are more extreme, then they spend less resources on campaigning (on average), compared with moderate parties. The reason is the following. Consider voters that are informed by one party only, say party 1. If both parties move closer to each other, then the actual and expected platform moves closer to the indi¤erent voters peak. By concavity of preferences, the increase in payo¤ of voting for the party that informed is bigger than the increase in payo¤ of voting for the other party. Thus, the previously indi¤erent voter now strictly prefers party 1. The e¤ect makes parties gain more votes by informing when parties are moderate. Since spending increases, voters are (on average) more informed when parties are moderates.
Introduction
In political science, an important issue is information transmission between political representatives and the electorate. This issue has several aspects.
One is the question whether parties send truthful information to voters, or not. This issue has been studied by Banks (1990) and others. Banks …nds that, if the realized platform of a party is far away from the median of the voter distribution, voters are able to infer the true platform of that party.
If the platform is close to the median of the voter distribution, this is not the case. Martinelli (1997) has studied whether voters can learn from parties that have private information during the electoral process. Schultz (1996) studies a situation where parties posses more information about the true state of the world compared with voters. He …nds that polarization leads to non-revealing sequential equilibria. However, in none of these papers is it costly to send messages to voters. An important aspect in campaigning is that it is costly to send information to voters. This motivates the study of a model with costly information transmission.
The main aim of this paper is to analyze how parties use resources for campaigning to inform voters. We describe how the resources spent on campaigning depend on how close parties are to each other and how this in turn a¤ects voters.
We study a general model and are able to show existence of equilibrium.
In the model there is an exogenously given number of parties. Each party has a predetermined ideology that is drawn from some distribution. This ideology could be determined by the history of the group, for example. The parties care about the number of votes as well as the consumption of some private 2 good. Each party has access to resources that can be used for campaigning.
Initially, voters do not know the platform of the parties. To a¤ect the voters the parties use campaigning to inform the voters about the policy of the party. The parties are assumed to use only truthful messages. If a voter is informed by some party, it is assumed that he knows the platform of the party with certainty. This, combined with risk aversion, makes informed voters on average more positive to the party. Given the platforms and the strategies of the parties, voters update their beliefs and then vote sincerely for the parties.
Then we study a symmetric model with two parties and …nd that, the farther away parties are from each other (on average), the less information is supplied (on average) in equilibrium. Note that informing a voter eliminates the risk of voting for that party. Then, consider voters that are informed by one party only, say party 1, and assume that the platform of party 1 is close to the median voter. For the indi¤erent voter, the expected platform of party 2 is closer to the voters' peak than the actual platform of party 1. Since voters are risk-averse, the voter would otherwise strictly prefer to vote for party 1. If both parties move closer to each other, then the actual and expected platform moves closer to the indi¤erent voters peak. Since voter preferences are concave, the closer to the peak a platform is, the ‡atter preferences are. This implies that the increase in payo¤ of voting for the party that informed is bigger than the increase in payo¤ of voting for the other party. Thus, the previously indi¤erent voter now strictly prefers party 1. The e¤ect makes parties gain more votes by informing when parties are moderate. Since spending increases, voters are (on average) more informed when parties are moderates. Thus, extremism leaves more voters uninformed.
Also, the uninformed voters are going to be more uncertain if the parties are further away from each other. The reason is that the variability of spending goes down.
One of the in ‡uences of this paper is Harrington and Hess (1996) . In
Harrington and Hess campaigning is explicitly modeled. Parties are assumed to have a …xed ideology. Parties can use resources either to move their platform closer to the opponent (positive campaigning) or to move their opponents platform further away from the party's own platform (negative campaigning). However, there is no explicit model of why expenditures can a¤ect voter's perceptions of the parties. Thus, the model of in ‡uencing voters is modeled as a black box.
The paper by Chappell (1994) has a more sophisticated model of voter behavior. In the model campaigning is assumed to be truthful. There are two parties that can choose either to spend an endowment on campaigning or not. Thus, only two possible levels of campaigning are allowed. Existence of equilibrium cannot be proven even in this simple setup. In contrast, in the model presented here, equilibria generally exist.
In section 2 the model is described and in section 3 existence of equilibrium is analyzed. In section 4 we study how spending depends on how extreme parties are and how this a¤ects voters. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Let Y µ < denote the policy space. There is a …nite set of parties, denoted by P , and a continuum of voters. Let X k µ Y denote the set of possible platforms for party k. For all k 2 P , X k is compact. Let X = £ k2P X k denote the set of platform pro…les. Also, for all S ½ P , let X S = £ k2S X k . For each k 2 P , the platform is drawn from a probability distribution g k : X k ! < + .
Let p k 2 X k denote the platform that is drawn. Let p = (p k ) k2P and for all S ½ P , let p S = (p k ) k2S . The platforms are not necessarily known to voters.
Instead, they are perceived as uncertain. However, voters (and parties) know the distribution from which the platforms are drawn. Let
Thus, the probability that a platform p k is drawn for party k is independent of the platforms drawn for the parties other than k.
The parties can use resources to inform voters of their platform by campaigning. The parties truthfully reveal their platforms. Thus, a voter that is informed by party k knows p k with certainty. A motivation for that assumption is that parties repeatedly take part in elections. By observing the actions of the parties in parliament, voters can infer whether parties have told the truth. The cost in terms of loss of reputation by sending untruthful messages deter parties from using such messages. Empirical evidence seems to justify this assumption. See for example Budge and Ho¤erbert (1990) .
Each party k has access to some resource ! k¸0 , which can be used either for informing voters or for consumption. Let ! max = max k2P ! k . Let c k 2 [0; ! k ] denote the resources party k spends on campaigning and v k the vote share received by party k. A party is concerned about getting as many votes as possible, as well as the consumption of some private good. Party k has the following utility function, de…ned over pairs (c k ; v k ),
where º > 0 is a weight re ‡ecting the importance of power.
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A motivation for the assumption that parties care about the number of votes is that the power of a party depends positively on the number of seats it controls. Another motivation is that the distribution of the electorate may be uncertain. Then v k is the probability of winning.
Voters vote sincerely, i.e. vote for the party that gives them the highest expected utility, given their beliefs concerning the platforms. Since there is a continuum of voters, strategic voting is not an issue. Let Pr k (p k ) denote the voters (common) posterior belief that the true platform of party k is p k .
Posterior beliefs are determined in equilibrium. The results also hold if u k (r k ; v k ) is concave, increasing in both arguments, u 12 > 0
Let V : < ! < be a concave function that is symmetric around zero and continuously di¤erentiable. The function V : < ! < is assumed to represent voters' preferences. We assume that V is concave, symmetric around zero and continuously di¤erentiable. 
Consider party k and suppose that voter i is not informed by party k.
Then, the expected utility for the voter, when voting for party k, is given by
If party k has informed the voter the payo¤ when voting for k is
Campaigning
The timing is the following. First, the platforms are revealed to the parties. Messages cannot be directed to speci…c groups of voters. Also, the probability that a voter is reached by party k is assumed to be independent of the probability that he is reached by party j 6 = k.
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Equilibrium
In this section voters update their beliefs when observing signals from parties.
Since voters need to compute expected utility of voting for parties they have not been informed by, we need to restrict the strategies for the parties to integrable functions. Let L 2 [X] denote the set of measurable functions on X
is bounded. Let the set of strategies for party k
Thus, the strategy space for each party consist of all integrable functions that are smaller than the endowment almost everywhere and bounded in the
Let¸k(A) denote the Lebesgue measure of A µ X k . For all S µ P , leţ S (A) denote the product measure of a set A µ X S . Also, let¸(A) denote the product measure of a set A µ X.
Convexity and compactness of the strategy sets is shown in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 For all k 2 P , the strategy space T k is convex and compact.
Proof.
Step 1: Convexity.
where for all x 2 X c we have c k (x) · ! k . Similarly, there exists a set
Step 2: Compactness.
Let B = ff j kf k · ! k g be the ball of diameter ! k . This ball contains T k .
By Alaoglus' Theorem, (Royden, (1988) ), it is compact. Thus, we need to show that T k is closed. Let fc n k g 1 n=1 be a sequence of functions such that c n k ! c k and, for all n, c n k 2 T k . Then, as a corollary of the Riesz-Fischer Theorem (Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1990) p. 206) , there exist a setX µ X such that¸(X) = 1 and a subsequence fc
converges pointwise onX, we have R
Voters Always Reached with Positive Probability
In this section, we only allow ½(0) > 0. This assumption is relaxed in the next section.
Consider the updating of voter beliefs. Given the information voters get they use the information to revise their beliefs about the parties. Clearly, if a party informs a voter, then the voter knows the platform of that party with certainty. However, if a voter receives information from party k but not from party j, then the voter knows that party j takes the platform p k as given when choosing his strategy. For each possible platform p j , given the strategy pro…le of party j, there is some probability that the voter is not informed. Given some platform p j , if the probability that the voter is informed by j is lower than the average probability of being informed by j, then the voter increases the weight on this platform p j . This follows, since being uninformed is more likely when p j is true. A similar argument shows that, given p j , if the probability that the voter is informed by j is higher than the average probability of being informed by j, then the voter decreases the weight on the platform p j . Thus, the voter can use Bayes rule to update beliefs over the types of party j. This process of revising beliefs would in general be di¤erent for di¤erent p k , since the strategy of party j in general varies with p k .
Let c = (c k ) k2P . Since ½(0) > 0, there is a positive probability that voters are informed by the parties in S when p S is true. Then Bayes rule can be applied and we have the following result. For all S ½ P , all k = 2 S, all z 2 X k , p S 2 X S and all c 2 T , the posterior density, denoted Pr k (z j S; c; p S ), is
If the expression above can be used to de…ne a probability measure, the corresponding measure is denoted Pr k (S; c; p S ). If S = ?, then this is a well de…ned probability measure, since c is measurable on X. Then, when S 6 = ?, this is also a well de…ned probability measure (Billingsley (1986) , section 33).
When studying convergence of measures, we use the weak ¤ topology.
To see how expression 1 is derived, let p(S j c; x) denote the probability 11 that a voter is informed by exactly the parties in S, given c and x 2 X.
Bayes rule gives
Since the electorate is large the share of the population of voters that is informed about the platforms for the parties in S, for a given x 2 X, is
Combining expressions 2 and 3 gives expression 1.
The following Lemma shows that, for all S ½ P , if c n ! c then there exists a subsequence of fc n g 1 n=1 such that, for almost all p S 2 X S , the subsequence converges pointwise a.e. on X ¡S .
Note that, if fc n g 1 n=1 is a sequence such that c n ! c, then, by the RieszFischer Theorem, there exists a setX µ X such that¸(X) = 1 and a subsequence, fc n l g 1 l=1 , that converges pointwise onX.
Lemma 2 Let fc n g 1 n=1 be a sequence such that c n ! c. For all S ½ P , there exists a setX S µ X S such that¸S(X S ) = 1, a setX ¡S (p S ) = fy 2
converges to c(p S ; x).
Proof. Let fc n g 1 n=1 be a sequence such that c n ! c. Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1990) there exists a set Y S µ X S such thaţ
Step 1: Finding measurable setsX S andX c S such that¸S(X S )+¸S (X c S ) = 1, and, for all p S 2X S , we have¸¡ S (X ¡S (p S )) = 1 and all p S 2X c S , we havȩ
X S is not measurable. Let¸¤ denote the outer measure associated witḩ . By Theorem 12.11 in Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1990) there exists a
Thus,X S µ Y S is a set of platforms for the parties in S such that, given
Thus,X c S ½ Y S is a set of platforms for the parties in S such that, given
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Combining these conditions gives¸S(X S ) +¸S (X c S ) = 1. Also, from a) and
Step 2: Proving that¸S(X S ) = 1.
Then we get¸(XnX) = 1 ¡¸(X)¸¸(X).
where the inequality follows from Fubini's Theorem, and the second equality since, for all p S 2X S , we have¸¡ S (X ¡S nX ¡S (p S )) = 0. Since, for all
, this contradicts the de…nition ofX. Thus, we havȩ
In reality, parties very seldom change their relative ranking. For example, democrats always are to the left of the republicans. Thus, we assume the following.
Separability assumption For all j; k 2 P such that j 6 = k, for all y 2 X j we have either z < y for all z 2 X k or z > y for all z 2 X k . 14 Now consider a voter who is indi¤erent between two parties j and k.
Given p S 2 X S and c 2 T , let x jk (S; c; p S ) denote the peak of the voter who is indi¤erent between voting for party j and party k when informed about the parties in S, if such a voter exists.
The following Lemma shows that, for all S ½ P , if c n ! c and V is strictly concave, then there exists a subsequence, fc
converges to x jk (S; c; p S ) for almost all p S 2 X S .
To give a hint of the intuition behind the proof assume that y < x i < z for all y 2 X j and all z 2 X k . Consider voters informed by the parties in some S µ P . Then, given that we have found some voter i with peak x i that is indi¤erent between two parties, moving closer to the party with the highest platform always makes the voter like that party more. Also, moving away from the party with the lowest platform makes the voter lose. This implies uniqueness of the indi¤erent voter. Also, a sequence fc n l g 1 l=1 that converges pointwise almost everywhere a¤ects the voter payo¤ continuously almost everywhere. This in turn implies that the indi¤erent voter changes continuously. Note that strict concavity is not used in this informal description of the proof. Strict concavity is needed when it is not the case that y < x i < z for all y 2 X j and all z 2 X k .
Lemma 3 Let S µ P and j; k 2 P such that j 6 = k be given. Let fc n g 1 n=1
be a sequence such that c n ! c. Suppose x jk (S; c n ; p S ) exists for all n. If the Separability assumption is satis…ed and V is strictly concave, then there exists a setX S µ X S such that¸S(X S ) = 1 and a subsequence fc n l g 1 l=1 such that for all p S 2X S , x jk (S; c n l ; p S ) converges to x jk (S; c; p S ).
Step 1: The indi¤erent voter is unique.
Fix c. Suppose j; k = 2 S. The indi¤erent voter is given by x jk (S; c; p S )
Suppose without loss of generality that, for all z 2 X k and all y 2 X j we have z > y. Di¤erentiating both sides of expression 4 with respect to x i gives the change in utility when voting for k as
and the change in utility when voting for j as
Consider any x i , y and z. Since z > y we know that
Then any voter h where x h > x i strictly prefers party j. A similar argument works for any other S.
Step 2: Continuity in c.
By Fubini's Theorem (Royden p. 307) there exists a set X I S wherȩ
is integrable. Then, letX ¡S (p S ) = fx 2 X ¡S j (p S ; x) 2Xg. Also, from Lemma 2, there exists a setX S such that¸S(X S ) = 1, a setX ¡S (p S ) such that¸¡ S (X ¡S (p S )) = 1 and a subsequence, fc n l g 1 l=1 , such that for all p S 2X S and all y 2X ¡S (p S ), c n l (p S ; y) converges to c(p S ; y).
Consider any p S 2X S \ X I S . From the assumptions on ½, there exists some
Since Pr k (z j S; c n ; p S ) is measurable, by the Lebesgue Convergence Theorem
, the solution for
Note that, if there does not exist a voter that is indi¤erent between party j and party k for all l there does not exist a voter that is indi¤erent between party j and party k when the strategy pro…le is c. Too see this,
Then, by expression 5, the …rst expression must be larger than the second when the strategy pro…le is c.
To compute the votes we …rst de…ne
Given p S and c, U (k; x i j S; c; p S ) is the expected payo¤ for a voter with peak
if he is informed by the parties in S ½ P and votes for party k.
For any c 2 T , let
Given S ½ P , p S 2 X S and c 2 T , O k (S; c; p S ) is the set of ideal points of the voters who, if informed by just the parties in S, would prefer party k. Note that the expression R x2O k (S;c;p S ) f (x)dx then is the mass of voters that prefer party k.
Also, note that the separability assumption implies that O k (S; c; p S ) is an interval. This follows, since if any two voters prefer to vote for party k, by strict concavity of V , any voter in between these two voters strictly prefer to vote for party k.
and max fx 2 O k (S; d; p S )g exist. Then there are parties j; l 2 P such that, given S, there is a voter that is indi¤erent between voting for party k and voting for parties j and l, respectively. Note that these parties might be di¤erent for di¤erent S.
Then, for some j 2 P , we have x jk (S; d; p S ) = min fx 2 O k (S; d; p S )g and for some l 2 P we have
Then, let v k (c k ; c ¡k j d; p) denote the votes for party k if party k chooses c k , the other parties choose c ¡k , and voters update beliefs according to d 2 T , for some p 2 X. We have
Note that, by separability, two parties cannot be perceived as identical by voters.
Let
and ½ is concave, w k (c j d; p) is quasi-concave in c k . Too see this, …x p and …rst assume that A(c ¡k j d; p) > 0.
By concavity of ½ we have
This implies that w k is concave.
Since the function w k is decreasing in c k (p), it is quasi-concave.
An equilibrium is a strategy pro…le for the parties such that, …rstly, each party chooses an optimal strategy, taking the other parties' strategies and voter beliefs as given and secondly, voters revise their beliefs given the strategy pro…le of the parties.
ii) for all z 2 X k , all S µ P , all k = 2 S and all p S 2 X S posterior beliefs are given by Pr k (z j S; c
The …rst condition means that c ¤ is a best response almost everywhere.
The second means that voters use Bayesian updating, according to the pro…le
Now consider the best-reply correspondence for party k 2 P , given that the other parties use the strategy pro…le c ¡k and voters update their beliefs according to c. Thus, for all c 2 T , let
! k ¡e+ºv k (e; c ¡k j c; z) a.e. on Xg:
The following Lemma shows that h ¤ has a closed graph.
Lemma 4 If the Separability assumption is satis…ed and V is strictly concave, h ¤ has a closed graph.
Step 1: v k (f k ; c ¡k j c; p) continuous in (f k ; c) a.e. on X.
Again let
=1 that converges pointwise a.e. on X. Then, letX µ X denote the set of platforms such that c n r 0 and f n r 0 k converge pointwise. Clearly, (X) = 1.
As in Lemma 3 there exists a set X I S where¸S(X I S ) = 1 such that, for all p S 2 X I S and all j 2 P nS, the function c j (p S ; y) is integrable on X ¡S . Let
Since¸(X(S)) = 0 for all S µ P and P is …nite, Step 2: f 2 h ¤ (c).
Step 1 implies that
for all k and all p 2X
Then, for all p 2 U , S µ P and all k 2 P , by construction of h ¤ , the beliefs are given by
Also, given these beliefs and by the construction of the mapping h The main idea behind the proof is to start with some arbitrary strategy pro…le for the parties and let voters revise their beliefs according to this strategy pro…le. Given this pro…le and the revised beliefs, each party chooses an optimal strategy. Thus, we construct a mapping from the set of strategy pro…les to itself. Then a …xed point theorem can be applied to show existence.
Allowing ½(0) = 0
Note that, if ½(0) = 0, the probability measures de…ned in expression 1 need not be well de…ned.
Since ½(! max ) < 1 we have 0 < ½ n (y) < 1 for all y 2 [0; ! max ]. Also, ii) for all z 2 X k , all S µ P , all k = 2 S there exists Z S µ X S wherȩ S (Z S ) = 1 such that for all p S 2 Z S , posterior beliefs are given by Pr k (z j S; c ¤ ; p S ) when Bayes rule applies.
The following result shows existence of an INE a.e. Proof.
Step 1: The candidate equilibrium pro…le and beliefs.
Consider a sequence f½ n g 1 n=1 . Since ½ n is concave, for each n, an equilibrium c ¤n 2 T exists by Proposition 1. Let fc ¤n g 1 n=1 denote a sequence of such equilibria. Since T is compact there exists a convergent subsequence, fc ¤ng g 1 g=1 with limit c ¤ 2 T . Also, for all n, all S ½ P and all k = 2 S, there exists a probability measure, Pr k (S; c ¤n ; p S ) de…ned as in expression 1.
Note that, since X is compact, any such measure is tight. Also, note that, by the Riesz-Fischer Theorem, there exists a further subsequence fc
that converges pointwise a.e. on X.
Step 2: Existence of limit probability measures. such that, for all S ½ P , all k = 2 S , Pr k (S; c ¤n hq ; p S ) converges weakly to
Step 3: Proof that c ¤ is a best response, given limit beliefs.
Consider the subsequence fc ¤n hq g 1 q=1 . This subsequence converges pointwise onX, such that¸(X) = 1. Note that, since c ¤n h q (v) converges to c
Since the sequence of measures converges weakly, for all S ½ P , for all k = 2 S and all p S 2 X S , we have, by the weak
When voter beliefs are given by Pr ¤ k (S; p S ) for all j; k 2 P , all S ½ P and all p S 2 X S , let x ¤ jk (S; p S ) denote the peak of the indi¤erent voter, when informed by just the parties in S ½ P and when p S 2 X S is true.
By a continuity argument similar to step 2 in Lemma 3, for all S µ P and all p S 2 X S , x jk (S; c ¤n hq ; p S ) converges to x ¤ jk (S; p S ) for all j; k 2 P . Also, for all v 2X, since c ¤n hq (v) converges to c ¤ (v) and ½ n converges pointwise to Step 4: Proof that limit beliefs result from c ¤ .
Consider the sequence fc ¤n h q g 1 q=1 . For any S ½ P , k = 2 S, let
Thus, C(S; c ¤ ; p S ) consists of all the platforms of the parties not in S such all parties in S spends a positive amount, given c ¤ and p S .
Fix some S ½ P and p S 2 X S .
Since¸¡ S (C(S; c ¤ ; p S )) = 0, Bayes rule do not apply and any beliefs can be applied. Then, for all S ½ P and p S 2 X S such that¸¡ S (C(S; c ¤ ; p S )) = 0, we assume that beliefs are given by Pr ¤ k (S; p S ).
Case 2:¸¡ S (C(S; c
LetX ¡S (p S ) = fv 2 X ¡S j (p S ; v) 2Xg. Furthermore, as in Lemma 3, we letX S = fp S 2 X S j¸¡ S (X ¡S (p S )) = 1g. Clearly¸S (X S ) = 1. Then, for any p S 2X S such that¸¡ S (C(S; c ¤ ; p S )) > 0 we have Pr k (z j S; c ¤n h q ; p S ) converges to Pr k (z j S; c ¤ ; p S ), for all k = 2 S a.e. on X ¡S . Then, by Sche¤é's Theorem (Billingsley (1968) 
Thus, for all S ½ P , all k = 2 S and all p S 2X S we have that beliefs derived from c ¤ are given by limit beliefs.
The idea behind the proof is the following. For each n, an equilibrium c ¤n 2 T exists from Proposition 1. Since T is compact there exists a convergent subsequence, fc ¤n h g 
Quadratic Preferences
Since the model in general is too complicated to solve analytically we restrict the analysis in the remainder of the paper to quadratic preferences. Then
Given some S µ P , c 2 T and p S , let E [p k j S; c; p S ] denote the expected platform of party k and let V AR [p k j S; c; p S ] denote the variance of the platform of party k. Now consider two parties j and k. Quadratic preferences implies that
Too see this, note that the payo¤ when voting for party j is
Similarly, the payo¤ when voting for party k is
Setting expression 10 equal to 11 and solving for x i gives expression 9.
Extreme versus Moderate Parties
The main issue in this paper is what happens with campaigning and voter ambiguity if parties become more or less extreme. To study this, let f be symmetric with mean 0. We also assume f 0 (x) > 0 whenever x < 0. We restrict attention to a situation with two parties where the Separability Assumption is satis…ed. Furthermore, let X k = fp kL ; p kH g where p kH = p kL +2l, l > 0 and p 2L = ¡p 1H . Let X = X 1 £ X 2 . Note that this is not a special case of the set of admissible platforms described in section 3 above. The strategy space for party k is then
De…ne ± = E fp 2 g = ¡E fp 1 g as the mean of the prior distribution for party 2. Thus, a party is either far away from the median voter or close to the median voter, relative to the expected platform. Also, by the Separability Assumption we have p 2L > 0 > p 1H which implies ± > l. Each platform is drawn with probability . This implies that the prior variance of the platforms for both parties is l 2 . The parties have access to the same amount of resources. Then, we let ! = ! 1 = ! 2 . Let c k (p 1i ; p 2j ) be denoted c kij . Given some p 2 X, and c; d 2 T , the votes for party 1 is
The following Lemma gives posterior variances and expectations when a voter is reached by one party only. Then we are able to compute indi¤erent voters when a voter is reached by one party only. Since we study symmetric equilibria, we can deduce that the indi¤erent voter is at 0, when voters are informed by none of the parties.
Lemma 5 Let c be a strategy pro…le. Suppose S = f2g. If p 2 = p 2i and c 2ji > 0 for some j 2 fL; Hg then
for each i 2 fL; Hg.
Proof. Updating of voters. Since c 2ji > 0 for some j 2 fL; Hg Bayes rule applies.
Let S = 2. Bayes rule gives us
Also,
Substituting in the expressions for A 1 and B 1 gives the desired result.
A similar result holds for party 2.
Now consider the optimal spending choice when a party is far away from the median voter, relative to the voters prior.
Lemma 6 Proof. Consider party 1. By symmetry, a similar argument holds for party 2. Let c be an arbitrary symmetric strategy pro…le. By hypothesis, we have
Step 1: x 12 (1; c; p 1 ) · x 12 (?; c; p ? ) and x 12 (12; c; p 12 ) · x 12 (2; c; p 2 ).
Case 1: x 12 (1; c; p 1 ) · x 12 (?; c; p ? ).
We have
: Case 2: x 12 (12; c; p 12 ) · x 12 (2; c; p 2 ).
numerator is nonnegative. Also, since E [p 1 j 2; c; p 2 ] < p 2 , the denominator is negative. Then we have x 12 (12; c; p 12 ) ¡ x 12 (2; c; p 2 ) · 0.
Step 2 
Proof. Let c be an arbitrary symmetric strategy pro…le. Consider party 1.
By hypothesis we have p 1 = p 1H .
Step 1: The votes for party 1. By using expression 12 the votes for party 1 is
Case 2: p 2 = p 2H . 
Step 2: Optimal spending choice.
By symmetry, we have x 12 (2; c; p 2 ) = ¡x 12 (1; c; p 1 ). Then, by symmetry of the voter distribution, we have (in Case 1)
f (y)dy:
From Case 1 and 2 in Step 1, the …rst-order condition is
for all i 2 fL; Hg. Since expression 14 only depend on c 2 through beliefs, the optimal choice for party 1 is independent of the choice of c 2 , given voter beliefs. This implies c In particular, we focus attention on stable equilibria.
Stability
To analyze stability, we consider an equilibrium and perturb the equilibrium pro…le. The players take the new pro…le as given and reoptimize. This again gives a new pro…le. Given this pro…le, the players reoptimize again and so forth. This gives a system of di¤erential equations by using the …rst-order conditions. Let c Lemma 8 Suppose º½
There exists a symmetric, locally stable INE a.e. on ¢.
Proof. Symmetric equilibria.
Step 1: The …xed point mapping.
Let Also, by construction, k(b) is the optimal campaign expenditure level for a party that has a platform close to the median voter, for beliefs resulting from b. Since k is a continuous function, there exists at least one symmetric equilibrium.
Step 2: Using k to …nd a candidate equilibrium.
Consider any interior …xed point c
Any …xed point satisfying 16 is a candidate equilibrium. Since k(0) > 0 and k(!) < !; Proposition 8.3.1 in Mas-Colell (1989) implies that there exists such a …xed point for almost all ± 2 ¢.
Step 3: First, we show that we can restrict attention to the stability of parties where the realized platform is close to the median voter.
Let B´(c Consider the best response, given some c. Suppose party 1 is far away from the median voter. Let
If party 1 chooses a positive spending level, c 0 1Lj , the …rst-order condition is
Since symmetry of the strategy pro…le is only used in Lemma 6 to show x 12 (?; c; p ? ) = 0; Lemma 6 implies that F (x 12 (12; c; p 12 ) · F (x 12 (2; c; p 2 )).
Also, we have x 12 (1; c; p 1 ) < 0.
It can be shown that
and
Since ½(!) < 1, B ? > 0 for any c · ! and A we have 
Now consider the solution to the …rst-order condition, given some c 0 2
B~(c ¤
. Let the solution to the …rst-order conditions be denoted c Thus, we can restrict attention to the case when parties are close to the median voter and show that this system is stable.
Step 4: The system of di¤erential equations of parties with platforms close to median voter.
Given i; j 2 fL; Hg, let c kij (t) denote the di¤erential equation for party k.
Using a …rst-order Taylor series expansion at c ¤ m of the …rst-order conditions, gives the system of di¤erential equation as
Note that 
Moreover,
Step 5: Stability of system in Step 4.
For i = 1; 2; 3; 4, let¸i denote the eigenvalues of this matrix.
Consider the …rst eigenvalue. It is given by Proof. Note that a stable equilibrium is locally isolated. Consider the e¤ects of a small change in ±. Let ¹ z(c
. At a …xed point we have
Consider a linear approximation of · at (c ¤ m ; ±). The linear approximation is given by c m = ® c ¤ m ;± ±+¯c¤ m ;± . By using a linear approximation at an isolated symmetric equilibrium we get
we have
Thus, The reason behind the result is the following. Note that, for …xed voter beliefs about c ¤ m , the positive e¤ect of reduced uncertainty on voters is unchanged. Consider voters that are informed by, say party 1 only, and assume that p 1 = p 1H . For the indi¤erent voter, the expected platform of party 2 is closer to the voters' peak than the actual platform of party 1. Since voters are risk-averse the voter would otherwise strictly prefer to vote for party 1. If both parties move closer to each other, then the actual and expected platform moves closer to the indi¤erent voters peak by exactly the same distance. By strict concavity, the closer to the peak a platform is, the ‡atter preferences are. Then, since the actual and expected platform of the two parties move the same distance, the increase in payo¤ of voting for the party that informed is bigger than the increase for the other party. Thus, the voter with peak at 
Voter Uncertainty
Reduction of voter uncertainty in this model comes from two di¤erent sources.
First, an increase in spending leads to a bigger share of the electorate being informed. Then, since c ¤ m increase as parties get closer to each other, the share of the electorate that is informed increases. The second source is that uninformed voters revise their beliefs, given the strategy pro…les of the parties. How beliefs are revised can be analyzed by using the result in Proposition 2. We have the following corollary of Proposition 2. The conclusion then immediately follows.
The fact that variability of expenditures increases as parties get closer to each other, makes it possible for uninformed voters to make a more precise prediction of the platform of the party. This in turn leads to the posterior uncertainty associated with a particular party to decrease. Thus, the uncertainty associated with the parties decrease, even for the uninformed voters.
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Conclusions
The model described in this paper analyses political campaigning. We are able to show existence of equilibrium under mild assumptions for an arbitrary number of parties. In general, it is di¢cult to explicitly solve for an equilibrium. However, in a symmetric example with two parties we can show that voters are more informed when parties are moderate, than when parties are extreme.
The motivation is the following. If a party informs a voter, then the party knows the platforms of that party with certainty. Thus, the risk of voting for that party is eliminated. Consider voters that are informed by one party only, say party 1, and assume that the platform of party 1 is close to the median voter. For the indi¤erent voter, the expected platform of party 2 is closer to the voters' peak than the actual platform of party 1. Otherwise, since voters are risk-averse, the voter would strictly prefer to vote for party 1. If both parties move closer to each other, then the actual and expected platform moves closer to the indi¤erent voters peak by the same distance. By strict concavity, the closer to the peak a platform is, the ‡atter preferences are. Since the actual and expected platform of the two parties move the same distance, the increase in payo¤ of voting for the party that informed is bigger than the increase in payo¤ of voting for the other party. Thus, the previously indi¤erent voter now strictly prefers party 1. The e¤ect makes parties gain more votes by informing when parties are moderate. Since spending increases, voters are more informed when parties are moderates. Thus extremism is bad in the sense that it leaves voters uninformed.
